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Equality Rights and  
Social Benefit Programs 
D. Geoffrey Cowper, Q.C.* 
I. AUTON: WHAT DID IT DECIDE? 
In Auton (Guardian ad litem of) v. British Columbia (Attorney Gen-
eral),1 our courts faced a perfect storm created by colliding social, polit-
ical, and legal forces. Socially, the families of children affected by 
autism have been engaged for a decade in lobbying and litigation to 
extend public funding for intensive behavioural therapy for their chil-
dren. Politically, lobbying efforts have strained the capacity of existing 
government programs, hovered uneasily in policy territory that is both 
health and education and involves substantial unforeseen costs. Legally, 
families affected by this disorder refused to accept that government 
could decide whether or not to fund behavioural therapy and at what 
level. In their view, they had the same right to public funding for treat-
ment of their children’s illness as families facing childhood cancer.  
The end result of the litigation in Canada was a case described by 
the Supreme Court as “the first case of this type to reach this Court”.2 It 
was so described because in the view of the Supreme Court, the unani-
mous findings in the lower court had been built upon an incorrect prem-
ise that the provincial medicare scheme conferred a statutory right to 
public funding for all medically necessary services. The Supreme Court 
concluded to the contrary that the medicare scheme created a publicly 
funded insurance health plan with universal access to partial coverage 
defined broadly by reference to services provided by medical practition-
ers and hospitals. The Court concluded that outside these core medical 
services, the statute had granted administrative discretion as to whether 
to extend public funding for treatments such as intensive behavioural 
therapy or other professional disciplines such as behavioural therapy.  
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The Court went on to consider whether the petitioners were wrongly 
excluded from funding under the statute as properly construed. 
The Court found that the petitioners’ central objection related to the 
delay in responding to reasonable demands for intensive behavourial 
therapy for funding for autistic children and in limiting that funding on 
financial and other grounds.  
The Court concluded that the proper comparator group had to be es-
tablished in relation to the executive or administrative consideration of 
extending the system to cover a non-core therapy rather than the extent 
of coverage for more conventional treatments:  
People receiving well-established non-core therapies are not in the 
same position as people claiming relatively new non-core benefits. 
Funding may be legitimately denied or delayed because of uncertainty 
about a program and administrative difficulties related to its 
recognition and implementation. This has nothing to do with the 
alleged ground of discrimination. It follows that comparison with 
those receiving established therapies is inapt.3 
In the result, the Court concluded that there was no denial of a bene-
fit on an enumerated or analogous ground since there was no evidence 
suggesting the government’s approach to ABA/IBI therapy was differ-
ent than its approach to other comparable non-core therapies for non-
disabled persons or persons with a different type of disability.4  
In the result, the Court found it unnecessary to deal with whether the 
element of discrimination could have been said to exist on the facts, but 
reaffirmed that this would have been a necessary analysis in any such 
consideration.5  
The perfect storm surrounding Auton6 raises the more general ques-
tion of the intersection of equality rights and the development and ad-
ministration of social programs. What room is there for an equality 
analysis in relation to these policy areas? In what respects must a legis-
lature be sensitive to its obligations to extend equal benefit of the law 
and to avoid discrimination in the definition and delivery of these pro-
grams? How is the fact that the law provides for a social benefit rather 
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than a definition of a general legal right or obligation significant for an 
equality analysis? 
In this paper, I address some of the criticisms made of the result and 
reasoning in Auton.7 I then address briefly the results and reasoning in 
other social benefit cases. That analysis suggests that the Court does not 
have a fixed approach to equality claims which arise in the context of 
social benefit programs. Rather, as in Auton,8 the Court appears consist-
ently to prefer a more narrowly legal means of resolving the disputes 
rather than employing general questions of social policy and considering 
how equality analysis may facilitate or interfere with identified social 
objectives. In essence, the equality discussion is about making certain 
types of distinction impermissible. To the extent that the decided cases 
indicate a trend, the Court appears to have little hesitation when it is 
convinced that the use of the distinction in its context is arbitrary and 
unfair. Certainly, the result in Chaoulli v. Quebec (Attorney General),9 
argued the day before the Auton10 case, belies the concern that the Court 
has become unduly timid in its approach to the Charter.11 
II. OBJECTIONS TO AUTON 
The criticisms expressed respecting the Auton12 decision can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. A Retreat to Formal Equality 
It has been said the lower courts reviewed the facts in the spirit of 
substantive equality and did not let legal structures interfere with the 
conclusion that the government decisions in the case were discriminato-
ry. The Supreme Court of Canada’s reasoning on this view is an  
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approach that is formal and does not address the underlying reality of 
the case.  
2. Comparator Group of Choice 
The Court’s selection of the comparator group that differed from 
that proposed by the petitioners is said to signal a retreat from the 
Court’s previous injunctions to view the question of discrimination and 
the proper comparator from the perspective of the claimants with the 
result that the government’s viewpoint is given undue weight. 
3. It’s All About Money 
In the build-up and publicity surrounding the Auton13 appeal, the 
fear was expressed that the scale of the moneys involved, and the fiscal 
impact on funding for other disabilities had an artificial and illegitimate 
(if invisible) influence on the Court’s judgment. I consider each of these 
criticisms in turn.  
(a) Formal Equality 
In the context of this debate, the phrase “formal equality” runs the 
risk of being used in only a pejorative and not descriptive sense. Finding 
the absence of a legal right to the benefit claimed does not constitute a 
refusal to go beyond the formal categories established by the statute.  
The remarkable aspect of this criticism is that it fails to have regard 
to the fact that neither the respondents nor the intervenors in support of 
the judgments below argued with any force that the interpretation of the 
Medicare Protection Act14 adopted in the British Columbia courts was 
correct. Both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal opinions express-
ly founded their view of the equality issues upon the conclusion that the 
right involved was funding for a medically necessary service within a 
universally funded medicare system.15 Neither court below addressed the 
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fact that the concept of universality in both the Canada Health Act16 and 
as referred to in the Medicare Protection Act17 refers to the access by 
insured persons to the publicly funded medicare system rather than the 
scope of services and medical procedures made available by the system 
itself. Rather, as held by the Supreme Court, both the Canada Health 
Act18 and the Medicare Protection Act19 consider the scope of services a 
question of comprehensiveness which in turn is defined by reference to 
the professions and institutions (principally doctors and hospitals) which 
make up Canada’s medicare system. 
(b) Comparator Group 
The criticism that the Court failed to pay sufficient deference to the 
petitioner’s selection of a comparator group depends in part on the 
proper view of the statutory structure. The comparator group proposed 
by the petitioners and adopted in the lower courts of children suffering 
from other illnesses or mentally handicapped adults disregarded the 
differences drawn by the statutory scheme between insured and unin-
sured therapies. In my view, the court has properly reaffirmed the over-
all principle that the legal structure and context of a comparative 
equality analysis is framed by the legislature and the relevant law.  
What is unclear from the reasons is whether the relative recency of 
behavioural therapy was only of historical significance or had a more 
wide-ranging impact on the analysis. The statutes, of course, distinguish 
between insured and uninsured therapies. Chiropractic care has been 
shuffled in and out of the medicare system throughout its modern histo-
ry, but is not recent. Nonetheless, it represents a therapy and service 
outside of the core of insured benefits. It is possible that a well-
developed and established therapy might justify a different comparator 
group in reviewing the governmental decision to deny or otherwise 
ration access to the therapy. The Court has made it clear, nevertheless, 
that in such case the claimants would nevertheless have to prove the 
remaining element of discrimination: 
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[I]t would still be necessary to examine whether the distinction was 
discriminatory in the sense of treating autistic children as second-class 
citizens and denying their fundamental human dignity.20 
There seems little doubt that the British Columbia courts were 
strongly influenced by the dramatic needs of the claimant families. Here 
was a therapy which offered the prospect of improvement to children’s 
lives, but which was costly and out of reach of the financial means of 
most Canadians. Further, it appears that the utility of this treatment is 
diminished or lost unless a child receives it in the first few years of 
diagnosis and for that reason the familiar delays of government in eval-
uating, preparing, and receiving approval for funding a new program 
were particularly upsetting to the affected families. Certainly, it should 
also be said that the atmosphere within which the utility of therapies for 
autistic children has been debated has become extraordinarily polarized. 
Some advocates of Lovaas therapy appear to regard almost any profes-
sional or governmental criticism of that therapy as rooted in ignorance 
and morally repugnant. However understandable, the charged atmos-
phere presented challenges for litigants, the counsel and the courts. 
(c) Fiscal Consequences 
The orders made in the British Columbia courts certainly presented 
a vivid example of social policy and social expenditures being dictated 
by the courts. However, the question of the fiscal significance of the 
orders below is not referred to in the Court’s reasoning. The character of 
the administrative and legislative decision as to the scope of coverage 
under the provincially funded medicare scheme is referred to for its 
legal and not social policy significance. Given the tenor of submissions 
by government and intervenors alike, the Court’s silence on the issues is 
clearly deliberate. 
In my respectful view, the argument that the result in Auton21 flowed 
invisibly from the concerns about the financial significance of the re-
sults below are in part rooted in an oversimplification of the govern-
ment’s position. In a case involving much smaller amounts at stake, Mr. 
Justice Lambert in the Court of Appeal in Eldridge v. British Columbia 
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(Attorney General)22 would have disallowed the constitutional claims in 
that case under section 1 of the Charter23 on the basis that the allocation 
of health-care funding raised intractable problems that were incompati-
ble with judicial decision-making. Thus, there are reasoned arguments 
which flow from the character of social policy decisions, and not from 
the scale of particular fiscal impacts. 
III. WAS THERE DISCRIMINATION? 
The Court concluded that it was able to dismiss the constitutional 
claims without addressing whether the claimants could have established 
the element of discrimination if they had been unable to overcome the 
first two obstacles to their claims.24 
Although this may well have been judicially prudent, the reasons in 
the courts below raised very interesting issues concerning the inference 
of discrimination in cases involving disability. Madam Justice Allan at 
trial had concluded that this was an instance of direct discrimination 
because the refusal to fund behavioural therapy in light of the evidence 
of its effectiveness could be only explained by a conclusion that autism 
was refractory and not amenable to treatment — a conclusion, which in 
her view, must have flowed from a stereotype about children suffering 
from autism. In the Court of Appeal, Saunders J.A. agreed, but added 
the further observation that the refusal to fund therapy acted to create a 
socially constructed handicap for these children.  
Certainly these conclusions were amongst the most interesting in a 
very interesting case. The trial judge’s reasons gave rise to the question 
of whether responsiveness to treatment is a legally relevant feature of 
disability just like its other characteristics, i.e., inability to walk, inabil-
ity to see, etc. Does a reluctance to acknowledge progress in treatment 
necessarily disclose a discriminatory motive or effect? If it may do so, 
when is it suspect and when does it reflect an honest disagreement over 
priorities or the results of treatment? Is an honestly held difference over 
the efficacy of treatment and the terms of delivery a foundation or an 
obstacle to a discrimination claim? 
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There is no doubt that obtaining public funding for a relatively cost-
free therapy is vastly easier than introducing one which involves sub-
stantial cost, unorthodox treatment, and a new category of health care or 
educational providers. In the Auton25 case, this controversy was some-
what heightened by the fact that the claim was to the families’ treatment 
of choice and a particular behavioural therapy. Indeed, one of the fea-
tures of what has come to be known as the “autism wars” is a highly 
charged atmosphere within which professionals who subscribe to the 
Lovaas approach are at odds with those who consider it a promising, but 
not exclusive approach to autistic therapy.26 
The Court of Appeal’s application of the concept of a “socially con-
structed handicap” is also interesting and challenging. Since it is a char-
acteristic of autism that those suffering from it have difficulty engaging 
with other people and the main goal of all therapies is to require them to 
engage with the world, a failure of treatment may well result in a social-
ly isolated and severely handicapped individual. Whether there is any 
logical distinction between withholding therapy and withholding funds 
for therapy, there can be little doubt that the outcome of the availability 
of therapy is important to the families of those suffering with autism. Is 
this, however, a “socially constructed handicap”?  
IV. ARE SOCIAL BENEFIT PROGRAMS TREATED DIFFERENTLY? 
The civil rights movement originated from concern over laws re-
specting fundamental issues of capacity and access. Thus, the common 
right to be free of any laws sustaining slavery arose from a fundamental 
conviction about the equal sovereignty and dignity of persons.27 Similar 
civil rights claims relating to gender and sexual orientation easily fit 
within the same tradition, even where they concern equal access to so-
cial facilities or general statutory rights or programs.  
The seminal decision of Andrews v. Law Society of British Colum-
bia28 concerned the equal capacity of landed immigrants and citizens to 
act as lawyers. 
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It is worth observing, however, that the defences in these various 
cases have all tended to flow from a sense of social principle. The insti-
tution of slavery was connected with a way of life and particular econ-
omy which was threatened by abolition.29 The “peculiar institution” of 
segregation in the American South had deep-seated social roots, which 
flowed from the conviction that there were real (even if unreasoned) 
differences between blacks and whites which justified separate schools, 
separate washrooms and the like.30 Certainly the differences between 
landed immigrants and citizens were regarded by the governments of the 
day as more than justifying the exclusion of non-citizens from qualify-
ing to practice law. 
Given this conference is, in part, dedicated to the 20th anniversary 
of the coming into force of the equality provisions, it is worth recalling 
that the Attorney General of British Columbia’s fundamental justifica-
tion for the statutory exclusion of non-citizens was one of political phi-
losophy: since lawyers played an important role in the legal system, and 
since laws are enacted by elected representatives who are accountable 
only to citizens, it is, therefore, only reasonable to restrict membership 
in the legal profession to citizens despite the ability of non-citizens to 
prove themselves otherwise qualified to practise law.  
It is easy to forget how fervently this view was held only two dec-
ades ago. Indeed, after the restriction was struck down in the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal the initial reaction by the Law Society of 
British Columbia was to immediately ask for a special sitting of a five-
judge panel to review the correctness of the reasons of McLachlin J.A., 
as she then was. Indeed, the Law Society and the Attorney General of 
British Columbia felt so strongly about the case that they asked for the 
co-operation of Mr. Andrews’ for the substitution of another petitioner 
so that the appeal would not become moot upon him being called to the 
Bar under the force of the Court of Appeal order,31 or upon becoming a 
citizen. 
Ultimately, in my view, the result in Andrews32 was the product of a 
fundamental conclusion that the citizenship requirement was more sym-
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bol than substance and did not have a foundation in any real difference 
between landed immigrants and Canadian citizens.  
However viewed, the history of civil rights establishes that justifica-
tions based on social values may well be suspect and social understand-
ings can and do operate as proxies for deliberate discrimination. 
There is, however, also a sense in which some social and economic 
choices have qualities which are not amenable to the judicial method. 
There are some cases in which the character of the statutory benefit and 
the underlying social choice appears to have influenced the outcome. In 
Law v. Canada,33 the differential impact was based on age in the context 
of survivors benefits provided under the Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”). 
The CPP then reduced survivors’ pensions for able-bodied surviving 
spouses without children such that the threshold age to receive benefits 
was 35 and that full benefits were only received at 45 and older. Alt-
hough as we all know, the Court pronounced a unanimous decision and 
exhaustively restated the factors for analysis of discrimination claims, 
the Court upheld the use of an age-based standard to distinguish be-
tween potential claimants and their need for long-term income replace-
ment. Indeed, the Court held that the clear ameliorative purpose of the 
pension scheme for older surviving spouses was a factor supporting the 
view that the CPP provisions do not violate essential human dignity. 
The Court found that Parliament is entitled to premise remedial legisla-
tion upon informed generalizations without running afoul of section 
15(1) of the Charter34 and being required to justify its position under 
section 1. The fact that younger persons had not had a history of exclu-
sion and stereotyping supported the view that the statute’s refusal to 
condition benefits on individual circumstances rather than categories of 
age was not discrimination. 
A similar analysis was conducted in McKinney v. University of 
Guelph35 in the context of a challenge to the mandatory retirement poli-
cy within universities. In the context of assessing whether the mandato-
ry retirement rule minimally impaired the rights of capable older 
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faculty, the Court referred back to the reasoning in Irwin Toy36 as fol-
lows: 
Minimal Impairment 
 In assessing proportionality and particularly the issue whether 
there has been a minimal impairment to a constitutionally guaranteed 
right, it must be remembered that we are concerned here with 
measures that attempt to strike a balance between the claims of 
legitimate but competing social values. In the case of broadly based 
social measures like these, where government seeks to mediate 
between competing groups, it is by no means easy to determine with 
precision where the balance is to be struck. As the majority of this 
Court observed in Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), supra, 
at p. 993: 
 “Thus, in matching means to ends and asking whether rights 
or freedoms are impaired as little as possible, a legislature 
mediating between the claims of competing groups will be forced 
to strike a balance without the benefit of absolute certainty 
concerning how that balance is best struck.”  
 The approach taken to these cases has been marked by 
considerable flexibility having regard to the difficulty of the choices, 
their impact on different sectors of society and the inherent advantages 
in a democratic society of the legislature in assessing these matters.  
In Lovelace v. Ontario,37 at the end of its analysis, the Court found 
that the exclusion of non-registered Aboriginal communities from a 
distribution of casino revenues flowed from the exercise of the prov-
ince’s constitutional spending power and did not by that exclusion im-
pair the “Indianness” of the non-registered communities. 
The Court’s determination to decide these cases on bases other than 
judicial deference is also evidenced by the results in Nova Scotia 
(Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Martin; Nova Scotia (Workers’ 
Compensation Board) v. Laseur38 and Granovsky v. Canada (Minister of 
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Employment and Immigration).39 In Granovsky, the Court held that the 
differential drop-out provisions available to applicants who suffered 
from severe and permanent disabilities would not be subject to a com-
parison with persons who suffered recurring, but not permanent disabil-
ity. Again, the Court found that there was no convincing human rights 
dimension to the complaint. The Court found that in framing subsidy 
programs, Parliament is called upon to target groups and that in doing 
so, drawing lines is an unavoidable feature. The Court declined to find 
that a legislative distinction as between groups of similarly disabled 
persons with respect to the qualification for public social programs was 
amenable to a discrimination analysis. 
In Martin,40 on the other hand, the Court took a very different view 
of a blanket exclusion from a benefits program on the basis of a selected 
disability. Justice Gonthier for the entire Court, found clear discrimina-
tion in the following reasoning: 
By entirely excluding chronic pain from the application of the general 
compensation provisions of the Act and limiting the applicable 
benefits to a four-week Functional Restoration Program for workers 
injured after February 1, 1996, the Act and the FRP Regulations 
clearly impose differential treatment upon injured workers suffering 
from chronic pain on the basis of the nature of their physical disability, 
an enumerated ground under s. 15(1) of the Charter. In the context of 
the Act, and given the nature of chronic pain, this differential 
treatment is discriminatory. It is discriminatory because it does not 
correspond to the actual needs and circumstances of injured workers 
suffering from chronic pain, who are deprived of any individual 
assessment of their needs and circumstances. Such workers are, 
instead, subject to uniform, limited benefits based on their presumed 
characteristics as a group. The scheme also ignores the needs of those 
workers who, despite treatment, remain permanently disabled by 
chronic pain. Nothing indicates that the scheme is aimed at improving 
the circumstances of a more disadvantaged group, or that the interests 
affected are merely economic or otherwise minor. On the contrary, the 
denial of the reality of the pain suffered by the affected workers 
reinforces widespread negative assumptions held by employers, 
compensation officials and some members of the medical profession, 
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and demeans the essential human dignity of chronic pain sufferers. 
The challenged provisions clearly violate s. 15(1) of the Charter.41 
With respect to justification under section 1, Gonthier J.A. 
acknowledged the relevance of budgetary considerations as it related to 
deference to governmental choices. However, the blanket exclusion of 
people who would otherwise qualify for the benefits was found to place 
it outside of any acceptable concept of minimal impairment. In El-
dridge,42 Lambert J.A. in the Court of Appeal concluded that the general 
framework set out by Oakes43 was unduly restrictive when the court had 
to consider a discrimination claim which intersected with the polycen-
tric nature of policy relating to social program benefits. His reasoning 
was as follows: 
 There is a national debate underway at the moment about the 
reduction of funds to be transferred from Canada to the Provinces in 
the future for Health, for Welfare, and for Education. There is a debate 
underway in each Province about the expenditure priorities for the 
reduced funds. In the allocation of scarce financial resources each 
Province will be required to make choices about spending priorities. 
Will medical equipment be bought for city hospitals or for small rural 
hospitals? Will the health care services in remote communities or in 
First Nations communities be improved? Is the best form of 
expenditure to raise the scale of payment for doctors and other health 
care workers? Should improved public facilities be provided for 
detection of cervical cancer, prostate cancer or breast tumours? 
 Some of the limits imposed under the Medical and Health Care 
Services Act and some of the financial allocation choices that I have 
mentioned have resulted and will result in adverse effects 
discrimination against people suffering from disabilities, including 
serious illness itself. But we do not have those cases before us. How 
can we say, in those circumstances, that expenditure of scarce 
resources on services that remedy infringed constitutional rights under 
s. 15, on the one hand, are more desirable than expenditures of scarce 
resources on things that cure people without affecting constitutional 
rights, on the other. And, indeed, how can we prefer the allocation of 
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scarce resources to services that remedy the infringed constitutional 
rights of one disadvantaged group over the allocation of scarce 
resources to services that remedy the infringed constitutional rights of 
a different disadvantaged group. 
 In my opinion the kind of adverse effects discrimination which I 
consider has occurred in this case should be rectified, if at all, by 
legislative or administrative action and not by judicial action. The 
evidence in this case disclosed that legislative or administrative action 
in relation to medical services for deaf people is being evaluated and 
considered. That evaluation and consideration can take into account 
many matters which were not in evidence before us. In those 
circumstances I have concluded that this is a case for judicial restraint 
and for deference under the Constitution and under s. 1 of the Charter 
to legislative policy and administrative expertise. 
In the Supreme Court, the Court acknowledged that the application 
of the Oakes test requires close attention to context and that where the 
legislature is balancing competing interests and is engaged in social 
policy, the application of Oakes must be applied flexibly. In particular, 
the Court observed that social benefits often have to select between 
disadvantaged groups and the distribution of resources in society as an 
exercise that must be given wide latitude. Hearkening back to the 
boundary between licence and review, the Court reaffirmed the observa-
tion in Tétreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Employment and Immigration 
Commission)44 that a court would not give any government unlimited 
licence in disregarding Charter45 rights and that a reasonable basis had to 
be demonstrated for concluding that the legislation had sought to mini-
mally impair the Charter46 right at issue. On the evidence before the Court 
in that case, the estimated cost of providing sign language translators for 
the whole of British Columbia was only $150,000 or approximately 0.25 
per cent of the budget. 
However, the Court concluded in Eldridge47 (as in Martin48 and 
Tetreault-Gadoury)49 that the blanket denial of benefits made it impossi-
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ble to characterize a governmental decision as one which was the prod-
uct of balancing competing social demands. 
Brooks v. Canada Safeway Ltd.50 is an interesting example of the 
Court expressing social policy in support of a discrimination claim when 
it concluded that imposing the cost of procreation upon women when 
only women can become pregnant when all in society benefited from 
procreation was discriminatory and unfair. Although not a Charter case, 
it was clear that the selection of pregnancy as a special state of health 
for the purposes of a disability or leave plan ran contrary to the view 
that “pregnancy is no different from any other health-related reason for 
absence from the work place”.51 
There are some occasions where legislative decisions during the 
course of litigation makes it clear that there is no real debate concerning 
an arbitrary legislative distinction. Schachter v. Canada52 concerned 
leave benefits to adoptive fathers. Pending the appeal, the Act was 
amended to extend the same benefits to adoptive and natural fathers. 
Development of work-fare programs for welfare dependent individ-
uals was the social policy context for Gosselin v. Quebec (Attorney 
General).53 That decision has been more closely reviewed elsewhere by 
Professor Cameron in Positive Obligations Under Sections 15 and 7 
Under the Charter: Comment on Gosselin v. Quebec.54 For present pur-
poses, however, the inferred social policy as between the majority of 
five and the dissenting judges is sharply at odds. Indeed, the majority 
went so far as to find that the denial of equal benefits to welfare recipi-
ents under 30 coupled with training and work programs affirmed the 
dignity and human worth of younger welfare recipients. Justice 
Bastarache in dissent noted that the record established that it was not in 
fact easier for persons under 30 to obtain jobs as opposed to their elders. 
Accordingly, he held that the distinction embodying the statute was 
based on a stereotypical view that young welfare recipients are better off 
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than older recipients and that the old assumptions regarding the employ-
ability of young people no longer apply.  
V. CONCLUSION 
There appears to be no obvious direction, either of deference or in-
terference, based upon the character of the underlying statutory program 
at issue.  
However, the ascertainment of the underlying social policy embod-
ied in the statutory provision certainly appears to be central to the con-
ceptual landscape for any section 15 analysis. 
The factual record in respect of social programs appears to have an 
unpredictable impact upon the reasoning. Thus, for example, the majori-
ty in Gosselin55 appears to have reflected a majority view respecting the 
interests of younger welfare recipients which the dissent believed was 
based on outdated and stereotypical views which did not accord with the 
evidence in the record. In Auton,56 the claimants unsuccessfully argued 
that proof of utility was conclusive evidence of discriminatory effect. 
It is perhaps noteworthy that in both Auton57 and the earlier decision 
of Tétreault-Gadoury,58 the Court decided that preliminary conditions 
did not exist for the raising of a legitimate section 15 claim.  
In the context of the overall jurisprudence of the Court, the outcome 
in Auton59 is not surprising. The Court’s careful assessment of the statu-
tory context in which the claim was brought is a salutary reminder that 
the benefit or disadvantage imposed by the law is the starting point for 
all section 15 cases. For government, of course, the definition of statuto-
ry programs becomes of great importance. At the same time, the Court’s 
decisions certainly support the view that blanket exclusions from other-
wise universal programs will be carefully reviewed and struck down 
even where there may be a rational basis for the distinction. A govern-
ment’s plea that it must perform a balancing act between societal and 
individual interests clearly has resonance with the Court and has done 
for the last 20 years: however, it will not be allowed to be used as a 
                                                                                                                                
55
  Supra, note 53. 
56
  Supra, note 1. 
57
  Id. 
58
  Supra, note 44. 
59
  Supra, note 1. 
(2005), 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) Equality Rights and Social Benefit Programs 109 
 
disguise for irrational and arbitrary rejection of the right of an individual 
to equal benefit and protection under the law. 
 
